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Abstract
This paper provides evidence on whether the creation of the euro has changed the way
global turbulences a⁄ect euro area and other economies. Speci￿cally, it considers the impact
of global shocks on the competitiveness of individual euro area countries and assesses whether
their responses to such shocks have converged, as well as to what pattern. Technically, the paper
applies a newly developed methodology based on in￿nite VAR theory featuring a dominant unit
to a large set of over 60 countries￿real e⁄ective exchange rates, including those of the individual
euro area economies, and compares impulse response functions to the estimated systems before
and after EMU with respect to three types of shocks: a global US dollar shock, generalised
impulse response function shocks and a global shock to risk aversion. Our results show that
the way euro area countries￿real e⁄ective exchange rates adjust to these shocks has converged
indeed, albeit to a pattern that depends crucially on the nature of the shock. This result is
noteworthy given the apparent divergence in competitiveness indicators of these countries in
the ￿rst ten years of EMU, which suggests that this diverging pattern is unlikely to be due
to global external shocks with asymmetric e⁄ects but rather to other factors, such as country-
speci￿c domestic shocks.
JEL Classi￿cation: C21, C23.
Keywords: Euro, Real E⁄ective Exchange Rates, Weak and Strong Cross Sectional Depen-
dence, High-Dimensional VAR, Identi￿cation of Shocks.5
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Non-technical summary
Has the creation of the euro changed the way the real e⁄ective exchange rates of the countries
sharing the single currency adjust to global economic shocks? Such a question is as relevant as
ever since the breakout of the global crisis of 2007/9. It is framed in a longer-standing debate,
however, on the economic costs and bene￿ts of European and Monetary Union (EMU), which was
particularly intense in the run-up to EMU ten years ago, but which has never really faded away.
The global crisis has indeed given a completely new dimension to the questions as to how euro
area countries￿real e⁄ective exchange rates adjust in the face of global economic shocks, and as
to whether the introduction of the euro has changed this adjustment pattern. Two main views
stand out. On the one hand, there is a perception in Europe that the single currency is a shield
against global turbulences. Noticeably, euro adoption remains undeniably attractive, as Slovakia￿ s
and Estonia￿ s entries as the 16th and 17th member of the euro area in 2009 and 2011 seem to
suggest.
On the other hand, the crisis has exposed the unsustainability of increasing divergences in the
external competitiveness of euro area countries during the ￿rst decade of EMU. The key question,
from the very onset of EMU, was whether ￿xing bilateral nominal exchange rates among euro area
countries would be a source of rigidities or how smoothly real e⁄ective exchange rates would be
able to adjust. This is not speci￿c to EMU but a classic dilemma for currency areas.
Thus far, the academic literature on the impact of EMU has yet largely focused on studying
convergence in prices and business cycles within the euro area, but it has not considered the way
global shocks a⁄ect the competitiveness of individual euro area countries. This paper aims to
help ￿ll this gap in trying to assess whether the creation of the euro has changed the way global
turbulences a⁄ect euro area and other economies, focusing on the adjustment of competitiveness
in the face of global economic shocks. To this aim, it draws from a newly developed econometric
technique, applying in￿nite VAR theory featuring a dominant unit to a large set of over 60 countries￿
real e⁄ective exchange rates. This technique allows to compare impulse response functions before
and after EMU following three types of shocks: global US dollar shocks, (non-identi￿ed) shocks
arising from generalised impulse response functions and global shocks to risk aversion.
The ￿rst key result of the paper is that the response of the real e⁄ective exchange rates of
countries sharing the single currency in the face of global economic shocks has become indeed more
homogeneous since the creation of the euro, and to an extent that is unmatched in the rest of the
world. In other words, the pattern of adjustment of euro area countries￿external competitiveness
in the face of global shocks has converged since the creation of the euro. This result is noteworthy
given the diverging pattern of individual euro area countries￿external competitiveness which has
been increasingly discussed since the outbreak of the global crisis of 2007/9. This, in turn, suggests
that the divergence in real e⁄ective exchange rates observed across the euro area in the ￿rst decade
of EMU is unlikely to be due to global external shocks with asymmetric e⁄ects but rather to other
factors, such as country-speci￿c domestic shocks.
Another key result of the paper is that the pattern towards which the adjustment of euro
area countries￿real e⁄ective exchange rate has converged to depends crucially on the nature of6
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1 Introduction
Has the creation of the euro changed the way the real e⁄ective exchange rates of the countries
sharing the single currency adjust to global economic shocks? Such a question is as relevant as
ever since the breakout of the global crisis of 2007/9. It is framed in a longer-standing debate,
however, on the economic costs and bene￿ts of European and Monetary Union (EMU), which was
particularly intense in the run-up to EMU ten years ago, but which has never really faded away.
The global crisis has indeed given a completely new dimension to the questions as to how euro
area countries￿real e⁄ective exchange rates adjust in the face of global economic shocks, and as
to whether the introduction of the euro has changed this adjustment pattern. Two main views
stand out. On the one hand, there is a perception in Europe that the single currency is a shield
against global turbulences. Noticeably, euro adoption remains undeniably attractive, as Slovakia￿ s
and Estonia￿ s entries as the 16th and 17th member of the euro area in 2009 and 2011 seem to
suggest.
On the other hand, the crisis has exposed the unsustainability of increasing divergences in the
external competitiveness of euro area countries during the ￿rst decade of EMU.1 The key question,
from the very onset of EMU, was whether ￿xing bilateral nominal exchange rates among euro area
countries would be a source of rigidities or how smoothly real e⁄ective exchange rates would be able
to adjust. This is not speci￿c to EMU but a classic dilemma for currency areas (Friedman (1953)).
As such, the functioning of EMU could be regarded as having been inadequate to prevent divergent
tendencies within the euro area, with some observers going as far as saying that the protection it
was o⁄ering has simultaneously o⁄ered excessive scope to diverge.
The literature on the impact of EMU has thus far largely focused on studying convergence in
prices and business cycles within the euro area (e.g. Enders, Jung, and M￿ller (2009), Canova
et al. (2006), Engel and Rogers (2002), and Rogers (2007)2), with such studies often ￿nding strong
evidence of growing business cycles synchronization and price convergence in the run up to the
introduction of the euro in 1999, albeit less so afterwards. There are also studies on the impact
of EMU on European integration, be it in trade terms (e.g. Baldwin (2006)) or in ￿nancial terms
(e.g. Cappiello et al. (2009); Coeurdacier and Martin (2009); DeSantis and Gerard (2009); Lane
(2006)). Finally, Fratzscher and Stracca (2009) identify a political economy channel through which
1In particular, the 16 euro area Finance Ministers noted in early-2010 that ￿competitiveness divergences and
current-account imbalances increased steadily in pre-crisis years and have in most cases largely persisted throughout
the crisis [...] Given vulnerabilities and the magnitude of the adjustment required, the need for policy action is
particularly pressing in Member States showing persistently large current-account de￿cits and large competitiveness
losses￿(Eurogroup conclusions on the surveillance of intra-euro area competitiveness and macroeconomic imbalances,
Brussels, 15 March 2010).
2European Comission (2008) and European Central Bank (2008) provide thorough surveys.8
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2 A high dimensional VAR model with a dominant unit of global
real e⁄ective exchange rates
Let xit denote the real e⁄ective exchange rate of country i in period t. We treat exchange rates
as jointly determined and we suppose that the vector of N real e⁄ective exchange rates, xt =
(x1t;:::;xNt)
0, is given by the following VAR model,
xt = ￿xt￿1 + ut, (1)
where ￿ is an N ￿ N matrix of coe¢ cients and ut is a N ￿ 1 vector of reduced form errors. We
abstract here in the notation from higher order lags or deterministic terms to keep exposition as
simple as possible.




￿ijxj;t￿1 + uit. (2)
In empirical applications, unrestricted VAR models typically include at most ￿ve to seven variables.
But in our particular case, we have 16 euro area countries plus the rest of the world as a control
group, i.e. a sample of over 60 countries￿real e⁄ective exchange rates. N is therefore over 60 and T
is about 120 (a decade of monthly observations). For reliable inference and reasonable parameter
estimation, we need however far more observations, such as several decades, if not a hundred years
of data. But even in this case, the estimation of an unrestricted VAR would not be an appealing
option due to the increasing likelihood of structural breaks in such a longer span of data. A priori,
the estimation of an unrestricted high dimensional VAR is therefore impaired by the ￿curse of
dimensionality￿problem.
2.1 Solution to the dimensionality problem
A number of approaches have been proposed in the literature to tackle this problem. We resort
here to the approach proposed by Chudik and Pesaran (2010). This approach consists in putting
a set of restrictions (that are binding only in the limit, i.e. as N ! 1) on the coe¢ cients of
the unrestricted VAR to shrink the space of parameters to estimate. These restrictions draw from
an economically intuitive notion, that of ￿neighborhood e⁄ects￿ , which is based on the idea that
some of the units included in a large VAR model (i.e. some of the over 60 countries￿real e⁄ective
exchange rates in our case) are more important than others and have non-negligible spatio-temporal12
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2.2 The IVAR model of real e⁄ective exchange rates
We make the following assumptions about neighbours, non-neighbours and patterns of cross-section
dependence. The US is treated as globally dominant, i.e. the in￿ uence of its currency, the US dollar,
is unrestricted. Put it di⁄erently, the coe¢ cients corresponding to the US dollar are left unrestricted
and, as such, shocks to the US currency can have non-negligible spatio-temporal e⁄ects on the real
e⁄ective exchange rate of any other country. This is a reasonable assumption to make given the
prominence of the US dollar in the current international monetary system, its overarching role
in global foreign exchange markets (see, for instance, Goldberg (2010)), which also rests on the
signi￿cant importance of the US in the global economy.
The US aside, we allow for an additional source of strong cross-section dependence in the system,
which could come, for example, from an unobserved common factor. This source is captured by
country-speci￿c cross-section averages of foreign variables, denoted as xit = (N ￿ 1)
￿1 P
j6=i xjt.
We identify the neighbours of a given country i on the basis of the intensity of bilateral trade
and ￿nancial linkages. We select as neighbouring units those countries that have "strong" such
linkages with country i. In practice, whenever the share of country j in country i ￿ s total foreign
trade or foreign ￿nancial exposures exceeds ad-hoc thresholds of 20% and 30%, respectively, it
is considered as a neighbour whose impact on country i is fully estimated. We consider three
sets of weights: bilateral trade in goods (constructed from the IMF￿ s DOTS database), bilateral
foreign equity exposures and bilateral foreign debt exposures (constructed from the IMF￿ s CPIS







ij, for a 2 fTr;Eq;Dg, is the weight of country j in country i￿ s total foreign trade or foreign
exposure to equities or debt securities, respectively, and ￿a is the corresponding threshold (￿Tr =
20%, and ￿Eq = ￿D = 30%). In addition to these selected neighbouring units, we consider three
spatially weighted averages which exclude the latter. These spatial averages are denoted as xa
wit;
for a 2 fTr;Eq;Dg (i.e. indices for the trade, equity and debt weights, respectively) and they
are treated similarly as the selected individual neighboring units, i.e. their direct spatio-temporal
impact on unit i is estimated fully.10

























for i = 2;3;:::;N, where the real e⁄ective exchange rate of country i in period t is regressed
on a constant, contemporaneous and lagged values of the US dollar￿ s real e⁄ective exchange rate
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(the dominant unit, denoted as country 1), its own lags, contemporaneous and lagged values of
cross-section averages (a proxy for an unobserved common factor, if present), lagged values of the
individual neighbouring units and spatial averages as de￿ned above. This cross-section-augmented
regression is estimated by least squares (LS).
For the US, the following marginal model is estimated:



















w1t + e1t, (6)
where it is to be noted that the contemporaneous values of cross-section averages x1t do not enter
the model.
The number of lags fpikg
3
k=1, fqijgj2Ni, and fra
i ga2fTr;Eq;Dg are selected using the Schwarz-
Bayesian criterion, with the maximum lag being set equal to 3 in all cases. The resulting model
space is thus quite large. For instance, the number of conditional models for a single country with
only one neighboring unit is 37 = 2187. Once estimated on a country-by-country basis, individual
models (5)-(6) are stacked and solved together in a large reduced-form VAR model (as originally
suggested in the GVAR literature; see Pesaran et al. (2004)). The solved high-dimensional VAR
model with a dominant unit can then be used for impulse response analysis in a standard fashion.
It is worth noting that our set of over 60 real e⁄ective exchange rates does not constitute a closed
system, i.e. we do not have all the currencies that are part of all the baskets used to construct
all of the real e⁄ective exchange rates.11 There is therefore no accounting constraint which can be
imposed to our system, which also implies that we can derive impulse response functions only for
e⁄ective exchange rates, and not for bilateral rates.
3 Comparison of pre- and post-EMU IVARs
How do global shocks transmit across space and time in the two high dimensional VAR systems
estimated prior and post-EMU? To address these questions, we compare the behaviour of real
e⁄ective exchange rates in the two systems by means of impulse response analysis. For this purpose,
it is worth stressing that identifying "pure" economic shocks is not at all essential.12 The only issue
that really matters is that it is the same shock (even imperfectly identi￿ed) which is considered
11Our main data source for the real e⁄ective exchange rates in our sample is the IMF IFS database, which does
not disclose details on the composition of their currency baskets and which might also change over time.
12Identifying pure shocks is arguably a traditional challenge in the literature due to e.g. the potential existence of
di⁄erent competing structural models underlying such shocks, or to the di¢ culty to identify their geographic origin.
As to the latter, it is reasonable indeed to assume that di⁄erent structural shocks, say productivity and monetary
policy shocks, are uncorrelated within a closed economy, but not when other economies are considered in the analysis.
This therefore makes it even more di¢ cult to identify such shocks in a large system. For a related discussion, see
Dees, Pesaran, Smith, and Smith (2010).15
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when comparing the two VAR systems, prior and post-EMU. As an aside, it would be a formidable
challenge to identify all shocks in our high-dimensional system (as this would require over 1,800
identifying restrictions!) let alone to identify the country origin of these structural shocks in our
multi-country set-up.
We study the spatio-temporal transmission of three types of shocks: a US dollar shock, (non-
identi￿ed) shocks arising from generalised impulse response functions and a shock to risk aversion.
3.1 US dollar shocks
The ￿rst type of shock is a "US dollar" shock, i.e. a shock to the system￿ s dominant unit. Con-
sidering this type of shock is a natural choice from an economic perspective, given that a possibly
large US dollar depreciation and a disorderly unwinding of global imbalances has often been - and
still is - regarded as a key risk to the global economy (Obstfeld and Rogo⁄ (2005); Obstfeld and
Rogo⁄ (2009); International Monetary Fund (2005); Blanchard and Milesi-Ferretti (2009)) and the
exceptional rise in US dollar volatility that occurred during the 2007/9 global crisis.
In constructing impulse response functions, we follow Holly, Pesaran, and Yamagata (2010)
who ￿rst introduced spatio-temporal impulse response functions in a system with a dominant unit.
Consider conditional models (5) and a marginal model (6) for the US. Since conditional models are
augmented by contemporaneous and lagged values of x1t it follows that
cov (e1t;eit) = 0, for any i = 2;3;:::;N, (7)
once a suitable number of lags are included in the individual regressions. The US dollar shock is a
generalised impulse response function in the VAR given by (5)-(6) with the restriction (7) imposed
in the estimation on the variance-covariance matrix of the residuals et = (e1t;e2t;:::;eNt)
0.
By contrast with standard generalised impulse response functions in small-scale VARs, the shock
to the dominant unit is exactly identi￿ed in a large N context if the US dollar is the only source
of strong cross-section dependence in the system. Exact identi￿cation in this case is given by the
statistical assumption of US dollar dominance, and the underlying intuition is the same as for the
identi￿cation of an unobserved common factor in the approximate single factor model literature.
However, if individual units are still cross-sectionaly dependent once conditioned on the US
dollar and its lags, the US dollar shock is no longer exactly identi￿ed. In this case, we refer to the
US dollar shock as being partly identi￿ed.16
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3.2 Generalised impulse response function shocks
The second type of shock we consider are generalised shocks to individual economies. Generalised
impulse response functions (GIRF) were proposed in Koop et al. (1996), and developed further in
Pesaran and Shin (1998) for VAR models. These shocks are clearly not structural in any sense, but
they remain useful to compare the dynamic properties of the two estimated IVARs. Generalised
impulse responses have the advantage of being independent from the ordering of the variables in
the system, which ensures that the results then obtained are not a⁄ected by di⁄erent orderings,
which would be otherwise the case with e.g. the standard Choleski decomposition.
3.3 Risk aversion shocks
The third and last type of shock we consider is a shock to risk aversion. Clearly, changes in risk
aversion and appetite are regarded as important drivers of foreign exchange markets, not only
when it comes to emerging market economies but also, more recently, to advanced economies (e.g.
McCauley and McGuire (2009), Adrian, Etula, and Shin (2010)).13 We remain somewhat agnostic
when identifying such risk aversion shocks and, to that end, impose "weak" sign restrictions on
selected currencies.14
To the extent possible, we aim to motivate our sign restrictions by taking into account currencies￿
"typical" behaviour in times of heightened risk aversion. To that end, we consider selected major
￿ oating currencies and emerging (presumably riskier) market currencies during major historical
episodes of heightened risk aversion in the last 20 years (the so-called G10 group of the most liquid
currencies in the foreign exchange markets and two reasonably liquid emerging market currencies,
the Korean won and the Polish zloty). Figure A.1 plots the change in the (log of the) Chicago
Board Options Exchange Volatility Index (VIX) index together with the episodes corresponding to
exceptionally large increases in the latter (i.e. Iraq￿ s invasion of Kuwait in August 1990; Russia
and LTCM￿ s crises in August 1998; the 9/11 terrorist attacks in September 2001 as well as Lehman
brothers￿failure in September 2008). Table A.1 reports the change in the real e⁄ective exchange
rates of the currencies considered during these episodes and the level of the VIX index. What is
striking is that the US dollar, the Japanese yen and the Swiss franc tended to appreciate during
these major episodes of exceptionally high risk aversion (although not during Iraq￿ s invasion of
Kuwait for the US dollar and the yen), possibly pointing to safe haven e⁄ects. On the other hand,
13In particular, the exceptional rise in volatility in the US dollar, euro and yen during the 2007/09 global crisis,
has been largely ascribed to an unprecedented rise in risk aversion which triggered a massive ￿ ight to the safety
and liquidity of US dollar-denominated assets and confounded previous scenarios of disorderly unwinding of global
imbalances.
14Identi￿cation with sign restrictions is referred to as "weak" here in the sense that a variety of structural models
could satisfy the selected signs.17
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the Korean won and the Polish zloty systematically depreciated, possibly re￿ ecting the fact that
they are often involved in risk-taking trading strategies which tend to unwind in major episodes of
market stress.
In line with this, risk shocks are identi￿ed by restricting the signs of the impulse response
functions to those where random shock draws lead contemporaneously to a (i) rise in the VIX
index, (ii) appreciation in the US dollar, Japanese yen and Swiss franc and (iii) depreciation in
the Korean won and Polish Zloty.
3.4 Comparison of pre- and post-EMU global shock transmission
In order to assess how the transmission of a given shock di⁄ers between the pre- and post-EMU
periods, we construct the following statistics based on the notion of euclidean distance between
impulse response functions.
The ￿rst statistics ￿￿















Pre (i;h) denotes the impulse response function in the pre-EMU IVAR system to a one-
standard deviation shock of type ￿ (i.e. either a US dollar shock, a generalised impulse response
function shock or a shock to risk aversion) of country i￿ s real e⁄ective exchange rate and at horizon
h (with hm being the maximum horizon considered and set equal to 4 hereafter), while g￿
Post (i;h)
denotes the impulse response function to the same type of shock in the post-EMU IVAR system.
The null hypothesis tested is that the impact of a shock of type ￿ is unchanged after the creation
of the euro, i.e. the euclidian distance is nil:
H0 : ￿￿
i = 0. (9)
We use bootstrap replications to compute critical values for ￿￿
i , where the replications used to
compute g￿
Post (i;h) are calculated on the basis of the data generating process from the estimated
pre-EMU IVAR system, and under the hypothesis of no break in coe¢ cients and variances.
The second statistics ￿￿
ij measures how di⁄erent the impact of a shock on a country after EMU
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For instance, taking Germany as the pre-EMU benchmark country, i.e. i = DE, the statistics helps
to measure whether the impact of a shock of type ￿ on a given country after EMU has become closer
to the impact it had on Germany before EMU (in other words, whether the pattern of adjustment
of country j￿ s external competitiveness in the face of global shocks has converged after EMU to
Germany￿ s pattern before EMU).
The null hypothesis tested is whether the impact of a shock of type ￿ on country j relative to













Again, critical values for ￿a
ij are computed by bootstrap replications where the replications g￿
Post
are computed on the basis of the data generating process for the estimated pre-EMU IVAR system
(and under the assumption of no structural break).
These measures of euclidian distance can be calculated for impulse response functions to a US
dollar shock and GIRF shocks. However, due to the very nature of the identi￿cation scheme, they
cannot be calculated for impulse response functions to risk aversion shocks as a variety of structural
models could indeed satisfy the selected signs.15
4 Data and stylised facts
Our sample includes monthly data for the period between January 1989 and August 2009, i.e.
approximately the decade preceding the creation of the euro and the single currency￿ s ￿rst ten
years.
For the data on real e⁄ective exchange rates, our main source is the IMF IFS database, the
broadest publicly available dataset on monthly (consumer price-based) real e⁄ective exchange rates.
For missing observations, we also use BIS (broad-58 country) real e⁄ective exchange rate indices
and occasionally construct our own indices for a few countries which were not covered in the IMF
or BIS databases. All in all, we have a broad set of 62 countries, including advanced, emerging and
developing economies. A detailed description of the data is given in Table A.2.
Figure 1 plots the real e⁄ective exchange rate of the euro area countries in log levels.16 Real
15For shocks to risk aversion, we follow the literature in summarizing the available information in multiple structural
models by reporting median and quantiles of impulse responses obtained through bootstrap replications. It should
be highlighted, however, that the median itself is not an impulse response function per se (and generally does not
belong to the space of impulse responses). In the same spirit, quantiles cannot be interpreted as con￿dence intervals
in this case and, for the same reason, measures of euclidian distance cannot be calculated.
16To ensure comparability between the two estimation periods, we only include in our sample those countries
which were members of the euro area from the outset in 1999 (i.e. Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany,
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain) and Greece, which joined relatively early on (namely
in 2001). We therefore discard those new EU Member States which joined later (after 2004), including Slovenia,19
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e⁄ective exchange rate evolutions have become more similar after EMU.17 But some di⁄erences in
external competitiveness evolutions did persist across euro area countries, which raises the question
as to where these di⁄erences come from. In relation to this, Table 1 reports the standard deviation
of the log-di⁄erences of the series pre- and post-EMU. Three striking observations stand out.
The alleged ￿ core￿euro area countries (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg and the
Netherlands) had far more stable real e⁄ective exchange rates than the other countries (the alleged
￿ periphery￿ ) before EMU. All countries￿real e⁄ective exchange rate have become more stable since
the creation of the euro (with the exception of Ireland), although not identically stable. Only
Ireland has had a markedly more volatile real e⁄ective exchange rate post-EMU than pre-EMU.
Table 1 also reports cumulated changes in real e⁄ective exchange rates over 1999-2009 and shows
clearly that external competitiveness -measured by this yardstick- deteriorated most in Ireland (by
about 30%), Spain or Greece (by about 20%), and least in Germany (by less than 7%). Figure A.2
shows the evolution over time of the corresponding de￿ ators, both cumulated and in log di⁄erences.
We treat real e⁄ective exchange rates as stationary in ￿rst-di⁄erences. Our estimation period is
indeed only a decade for each of the two IVARs and unit root tests do not reject the null of a unit
root in levels in our data.18 This is also in line with several well-established theoretical reasons for
the presence of non-stationarity in real e⁄ective exchange rates, such as non-comparability between
the baskets used for the construction of relative price indices or Balassa-Samuelson e⁄ects.
Turning to other variables, foreign trade weights are constructed from the IMF DOTS database
on the basis of the average of bilateral imports and exports from 2004 to 2006. Financial weights
are constructed from the IMF CPIS database as the average of bilateral foreign assets and liabilities
(both for equities and debt securities) over 2000-2006.
5 Salient estimation and speci￿cation test results
The estimation results from our two IVAR models appear reasonable and a battery of speci￿cation
tests suggest that our models are well speci￿ed and characterise rather well the complex interactions
and dynamics of our high-dimensional real e⁄ective exchange rate systems. Due to the very large
amount of regressions involved, we only review in the following the main estimation and speci￿cation
tests results.
Slovakia, Malta, Cyprus and Estonia.
17Prior to EMU, a large part of the volatility in the relative evolution of REERs across European economies
occurred between the late 1980s and the mid-1990s.
18These results are not reported due to space considerations. Even in longer time spans of data, it is common to
￿nd unit roots in real e⁄ective exchange rates (see e.g. Pesaran et al. (2004)), although for very long periods - such
as centuries - there is some evidence of mean reversion, see for instance Taylor et al. (2001). Such very long datasets
are available for a handful of currencies, however.20
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5.1 Stability of the models
The estimated models are stable. Figure 2 plots by descending order the absolute value of the
largest 60 eigenvalues of the estimated IVAR systems￿corresponding companion matrix (out of
over 186) and shows that they all stand well below unity. The single largest eigenvalues equal 0.64
(pre-EMU) and 0.82 (post-EMU), which also suggests that shocks to real e⁄ective exchange rates
in the two systems tend to die out somewhat rapidly.
5.2 Signi￿cance of the coe¢ cients
Our prior that some channels of transmission of shocks in the two systems are more important than
others is largely con￿rmed (see Table 2).19 Most notably, the prior that the US is a dominant unit
is vindicated: the US dollar has statistically signi￿cant spatio-temporal contamporaneous e⁄ects
on about two-third of the countries￿real e⁄ective exchange rates before EMU, and on about four-
￿fth thereof after EMU. Other sources of strong cross-section dependence, such as an unobserved
common factor, also seem to play a role, most notably after 1999. Contemporenous cross-section
averages are indeed found to be statisically signi￿cant for over half of the countries￿real e⁄ective
exchange rates post-EMU. Trade and ￿nancial linkages tend to have limited statistically signi￿cant
spatio-temporal e⁄ects (with the exception of foreign equity exposures pre-EMU, which then matter
for less than one-￿fth of the countries). Moreover, there is evidence for some persistence in real
e⁄ective exchange rate dynamics, since exchange rate lags enter signi￿cantly in over half of the two
IVAR models￿equations. Last, the impact of neighbouring units other than the US is found to be
signi￿cant for 20% of the countries considered pre-EMU, against about 10% post-EMU.
These conclusions are broadly con￿rmed by standard F-tests for the joint signi￿cance of con-
temporaneous and lagged values of the explanatory variables. Figure 3 and Figure 4 report the test
results for each of these variables and for both estimation periods. The size of the test is reported
on the x-axis and rejection rates for the null hypothesis of no joint signi￿cance are reported on the
y-axis. For instance, results for the dominant unit indicate that the null hypothesis of no direct
US dollar e⁄ect, namely
H0 : a‘;i = 0 for all ‘ 2 f0;1;::;pig,
is rejected for about half of the countries at the 1% level of con￿dence pre-EMU, against 70% of the
countries post-EMU. Overall, the test results con￿rm that the US, other unobserved common e⁄ects
and persistence in real e⁄ective exchange rate dynamics are signi￿cantly present for a large share of
the 62 countries we consider, both pre- and post-EMU. Conversely, the in￿ uence of the remaining
variables (trade and ￿nancial linkages, other neighbouring units) is less -if at all- ascertained.
19Detailed results for all economies are available from the authors upon request.21
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5.3 Tests for weak exogeneity of the US dollar
The assumption that the contemporaneous change in the US dollar is weakly exogenous in the
equations for the remaining currencies can be tested by using the procedure proposed by Wu
(1973). Let b e1t denote the residuals from the estimated model for the dominant unit. We run the
following auxiliary regressions for countries i = 2;3;:::;N,























wit + !ib e1t + eit,
which correspond to conditional country models in (5) augmented by the extra term !ib e1t. Wu￿ s
approach consists in testing the signi￿cance of b !i using a standard t-test. In practice, if the US
dollar was not weakly exogenous, ^ !i should be statistically signi￿cant. This testing procedure is
asymptotically equivalent to that of Hausman (1978), which is based on the statistical signi￿cance
of the di⁄erence between instrumental variable and least squares estimates.
A summary of the Wu-Hausman test results for weak exogeneity of the US dollar is reported
in Figure 11, which displays rejection rates (i.e. the number of countries for which the null was
rejected divided by the overall number of conditional models) for di⁄erent nominal size of the test.
In both estimation periods, i.e. pre- and post-EMU, rejection rates are very close to the nominal
size of the test, which suggests that there is no evidence against weak exogeneity of the US dollar.
5.4 Economic meaningfulness (contemporaneous elasticities w.t. US dollar
changes)
The sign and magnitude of the main estimation results are also in line with economic intuition.
In particular, when considering the estimated elasticity of the 61 countries￿real e⁄ective exchange
rate with respect to contemporaneous US dollar changes post-EMU (see Figure 5), it is striking
to observe that the elasticity for countries such as Saudi Arabia and China, two well-known US
dollar peggers, is found to be positive and close to unity, while that for so-called "commodity
currencies", which are not pegged to the US dollar, and are often believed by market participants
to move inversely with the US dollar (see International Monetary Fund (2008)), is indeed found to
be negative and close to -1.
5.5 Goodness of ￿t
In terms of goodness of ￿t, the adjusted R2 (hereby denoted R
2), of country-speci￿c models range
from close to 0 to 85% (see Figure 6 for the post-EMU IVAR). The R
2 for the US marginal model22
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stands at 13% (pre-EMU) and 18% (post-EMU). For a majority of the countries considered, R
2 is
larger than commonly found in the empirical literature on real e⁄ective exchange rates, due to the
fact that -in our set of conditional variables- the dominant unit and cross-section averages already
capture a large share of the data￿ s cross-section dependence.
5.6 Residual serial correlation
We formally test for residual serial correlation using the Breusch-Godfrey test with 4 lags, with
the null being no serial correlation and the alternative hypothesis being that errors follow an
ARMA(p;q) process, with max(p;q) = 4. There is strong evidence in support of no remaining
serial correlation in the residuals, since the null is rejected at the 1% level of con￿dence for only
two countries in each period (Israel and Romania in the pre-EMU IVAR system; Ecuador and
Antigua-Barbuda in the post-EMU IVAR system).
5.7 Structural breaks
Last, we test for the existence of possible structural breaks with a large array of tests, including
Ploberger and Kr￿mer (1992) maximal OLS cumulative sum (CUSUM) statistics (denoted PKsup);
its mean square variant (PKmsq); Nyblom (1989)￿ s tests for parameter constancy against non-
stationary alternatives (N); the Wald form of Quandt (1960)￿ s likelihood ratio statistics (QLR);
the mean Wald statistics of Hansen (MW); and Andrews and Ploberger (1994)￿ s Wald statistics
based on exponential averages (APW). The last three tests are Wald type tests for a single break
at an unknown point in time. We also run heterokedasticity-robust versions of these tests.
Table 3 reports an overview of the tests￿results. There is little statistical evidence with which
to reject the hypothesis of coe¢ cient stability in the case of 73% to 92% (depending on the test) of
the equations comprising the IVAR model pre-EMU and in the case of 74% to 98% of the equations
post-EMU. This order of magnitude is very much in line with results found in the GVAR literature
(see e.g. DØes, di Mauro, Pesaran, and Smith (2007)). The non-robust versions of the QLR, MW
and APW tests, however, show a relatively larger number of rejections. In view of the test outcomes
for the robust versions of these tests, the main reason for the rejection seems to be breaks in error
variances and not in the parameter coe¢ cients. Once possible changes in error variances are allowed
for and robust versions of these three tests considered indeed, the parameter coe¢ cients seem to be
reasonably stable. This conclusion is in line with many recent studies that ￿nd some evidence of
changing volatility as documented, among others, by Stock and Watson (2002), Artis et al. (2004)
and Cecchetti et al. (2005). Overall, not surprisingly there is some evidence of structural instability
but this seems to be mainly con￿ned to error variances.20 To address the possibility of breaks in
20Over the two decades we consider, some of the countries in our sample have indeed experienced well-known23
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error variances, we focus on the bootstrap means of the impulse responses in the empirical analysis
hereafter.
As a robustness check of these results, we also re-estimate pre- and post-EMU systems with
country speci￿c dummies set to capture one-o⁄ exceptional events of unusually large exchange rate
movements, such devaluations, realignments in the European Exchange Rate Mechanism, etc. A
full list of these dummies is reported in Table A.3. The results obtained are largely similar as those
without dummies and we therefore focus on the estimation results without dummies hereafter.
6 Spatio-temporal transmission of shocks before and after EMU
6.1 US dollar shocks
Figure 7 reports the contemporaneous impact of a one standard deviation shock to the US dollar
on the real e⁄ective exchange rate of the euro area countries, both pre- and post-EMU, along with
90% con￿dence intervals computed with 2,000 boostrap replications.
In the decade preceding EMU, the impact of such a shock was signi￿cantly diverse across coun-
tries. For instance, a typical one-standard deviation appreciation of the US dollar￿ s real e⁄ective
exchange rate (i.e. about 1.25%) was associated with a 0.4% contemporaneous depreciation of the
Deutsche Mark. The currencies from some of the other future euro area members depreciated in
tandem, including that of Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Ireland and the Netherlands, albeit
to a smaller extent (i.e. in the order of 0.1%-0.3%). By contrast, Italy and Greece￿ s real e⁄ective
exchange rates tended to appreciate, although to an extent that was not signi￿cantly di⁄erent from
zero. Those of Luxembourg and Portugal were clearly una⁄ected. These results are partly remi-
niscent of a key stylized fact of the 1980s related to US dollar shocks. Giavazzi et al. (1986) had
found indeed that the Deutsche Mark usually appreciated against other European currencies when
the US dollar depreciated in that decade, which would then dampen the e⁄ect of dollar shocks on
the REER of France and Italy and amplify that on Germany￿ s. Our results for Germany and Italy
do con￿rm this (but not those for France, admittedly).
The picture after EMU is completely di⁄erent. All of the euro area countries￿real e⁄ective
exchange rates now respond similarly to US dollar shocks, including those of Italy, Greece, Luxem-
bourg and Portugal which used to respond di⁄erently before the euro was introduced. According
to the estimates, further to a one-standard deviation appreciation of the US dollar￿ s real e⁄ective
exchange rate (i.e. again about 1.25%), the real e⁄ective exchange rate of all euro area countries
depreciate contemporaneously within a range of 0.3%-0.6%. In other words, the pattern of adjust-
ment of euro area countries￿external competitiveness in the face of a US dollar shock has been more
devaluations, exchange rate regime changes and other large country-speci￿c shock (such as Germany￿ s uni￿cation).24
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to the distance between the impulse response to a US dollar shock on euro area member j after
EMU and Germany before EMU (distances which have become statistically signi￿cantly larger are
highlighted in bold); and the ￿us
i;j statistics reported in the third column takes any of the euro area
countries as a benchmark and therefore refers to the distance between the impulse response to a US
dollar shock on euro area member j and benchmark euro area member i before EMU (the column
reports the number of countries for which the distance has not become statistically signi￿cantly
smaller after EMU).
The null hypothesis that the impact of a US dollar shock is the same before and after EMU
is rejected for Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Greece, but not for the remaining
euro area countries. Interestingly, ￿us
i is smallest for Germany, suggesting that Germany￿ s external
competitiveness pattern of adjustment to US dollar shocks is the least a⁄ected by the creation of
the euro. This is also true for Austria and the Netherlands, which used to manage their legacy
currencies very tightly vis-￿-vis the Deutsche Mark prior to EMU. Conversely, ￿us
i is largest for
Ireland, Italy and Greece (but not for Spain), three countries of the alleged "periphery" of the area.
The null hypothesis that the impact of a US dollar shock is the same after EMU as it was
for Germany before EMU is rejected for none of the euro area countries. This con￿rms that the
reponse of the real e⁄ective exchange rate of all euro are countries to a US dollar shock is now
quite similar to that of Germany prior to EMU. In other words, the pattern of adjustment of euro
area countries￿ s external competitiveness in the face of such a global shock has converged after
EMU to Germany￿ s pattern before EMU. Put it again di⁄erently, their adjustment is not akin to
the simple average of countries￿patterns of adjustment before the euro, or to that of the country
issuing the least credible of the legacy currencies, or even to something completely new, but to
the pattern of adjustment of the economy that used to issue what is often regarded as one of the
most credible of the legacy currencies. Last, but not least, the ￿us
ij statistics suggests that the
post-EMU responses of all euro area countries have become systematically closer to Germany￿ s
pre-EMU response. This again suggests that their corresponding pattern of adjustment in external
competitiveness has converged to that of Germany. Conversely, there is evidence that 7 to 8 euro
area countries￿post-EMU responses have become more distant (i.e. diverged) from Portugal or
Greece￿ s pre-EMU responses (i.e. pattern of adjustment in external competitiveness).
6.2 Generalised impulse response function shocks
We next turn to GIRF shocks. As aforementioned, these cannot be interpreted as structural
economic shocks (unlike dominant unit shocks), although they remain useful to understand the dy-
namics of global real e⁄ective exchange rates pre- and post- EMU. In constructing impulse response26
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6.3 Risk aversion shocks
To identify risk aversion shocks, we draw 2,000 candidate shocks that satisfy the required signs
and replicate this exercise with 200 boostrap replications to address estimation uncertainty. We do
this for our two decade-long estimation periods. Figure 13 reports the median and quantiles of the
successful draws.
There is evidence that euro area legacy currencies assumed a safe haven role before EMU,
particularly those of the countries belonging to the alleged ￿core￿of the future area. In line with
this, the impact of a shock to risk aversion generally triggered an appreciation of these euro area
legacy currencies. Such a shock to risk aversion21 was associated with a 0.5% contemporaneous
appreciation of the Deutsche Mark. Other currencies from future euro area members appreciated
in tandem -including that of Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Ireland, Luxembourg and the
Netherlands- within a range of about 0.2% to 0.5%. Currencies of some of the countries at the
alleged ￿periphery￿of the future area did not have such a safe haven role, however. In particular,
Italy, Spain and Portugal￿ s real e⁄ective exchange rates tended to depreciate (although the impact
was insigni￿cantly di⁄erent from zero for Italy), and that of Greece was clearly una⁄ected.
The picture after EMU is, again, completely di⁄erent. Almost all euro area countries￿real
e⁄ective exchange rates now respond more similarly to a shock to risk aversion. According to the
estimates, further to a shock to risk aversion22 the real e⁄ective exchange rate of most euro area
countries tend to depreciate contemporaneously, within a range of -0.5% to -0.3%. Two exceptions
are Finland and Portugal￿ s exchange rates, which remain una⁄ected by the shock. In other words,
the response of the real e⁄ective exchange rate of most euro are countries to global shocks to risk
aversion is now more similar to that of Spain or Italy prior to EMU or, di⁄erently put, their
pattern of adjustment in external competitiveness is now akin to that of these countries belonging
to the alleged "periphery" of the area. Arguably, the changing sign of the response of most euro
area countries does not necessarily mean that the euro has lost the safe haven status that some
of the legacy currencies had before EMU. This evolution might also re￿ ect the fact that the euro
has become the globally most relevant alternative to the US dollar as an international currency
and hence one of the main counterparts to movements in the US dollar in times of heightened
uncertainty and ￿ ight to the safety and liquidity of US dollar assets. This seems to have been
21Corresponding to an appreciation of the US dollar, Japanese yen and Swiss franc of 0.5%, 1.5% and 1.2%,
respectively; a depreciation of the Korean won and Polish zloty of -3.1% and -3.0%, respectively; and an increase in
the VIX of 10%.
22Corresponding to an appreciation of the US dollar, Japanese yen and Swiss franc of 1.2%, 2.2% and 1.2%,
respectively; a depreciation of the Korean won and Polish zloty of -2.4% and -2.2%, respectively; and an increase in
the VIX of 20%.28
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particularly the case during the 2007/9 crisis (see e.g. McCauley and McGuire (2009)).
Figures 14, 15 and 16 report the impulse response functions to a risk aversion shock for selected
euro area countries, other major ￿ oaters, New EU Member States and Iceland, respectively, as in
Section 6.1. Not surprisingly, the US dollar, Japanese yen and Swiss franc appreciate further to
a risk aversion shock (with the impact of the shock vanishing completely after about two to four
months), while the Polish zloty depreciates (with the impact of the shock vanishing completely
after about two to ￿ve months), in line with the signs chosen for our identi￿cation scheme.
As a robustness check, we have also re-estimated the post-EMU system with a shorter sample
period that excludes the 2007/9 global ￿nancial crisis (with the sample ending in June 2007) to
abstract from possible e⁄ects arising from the period of exceptional market volatility that prevailed
during these two years. Interestingly, the results for the risk shock are qualitatively similar, albeit
with larger quantiles ranges, which suggests that our benchmark results were not driven by the
global ￿nancial crisis.
As aforementioned, it is worth repeating that we cannot test formally if the impulse response
functions di⁄er statistically signi￿cantly across estimation periods and countries, given that the
shock to risk aversion is not exactly identi￿ed. We do not have here a unique shock that statis￿es
the restricted signs but many. Hence, many di⁄erent impulse response candidates (not only one)
could be used to calculate euclidian distance measures. We have followed the literature by reporting
median and quantiles of the impulse responses obtained through bootstrap replications. It should
be highlighted, however, that the median itself is not an impulse response function per se (and
generally does not belong to the space of impulse responses) and, in the same spirit, quantiles
cannot be interpreted as con￿dence intervals.23
7 Conclusion
This paper has tried to assess whether the creation of the euro has changed the way global tur-
bulences a⁄ect euro area and other economies, focusing on the adjustment of competitiveness in
the face of global economic shocks. To this aim, it has drawn from a newly developed econometric
technique, applying in￿nite VAR theory featuring a dominant unit to a large set of over 60 coun-
tries￿real e⁄ective exchange rates. This technique allows to compare impulse response functions
before and after EMU following three types of shocks: global US dollar shocks, (non-identi￿ed)
shocks arising from generalised impulse response functions and global shocks to risk aversion. The
estimated systems successfully pass a range of speci￿cation tests with regard to stability, economic
meaningfulness of the coe¢ cients, weak exogeneity of the dominant unit, residual serial correla-
23For this very reason measures of euclidian distance are not calculated for this particular type of shock.29
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A Additional Tables and Figures
Figure A.1: Selected historical episodes of heightened risk aversion and increases in the VIX index
Table A.1: Change in real e⁄ective exchange rates and level of the VIX during selected
historical episodes of heightened risk aversion
Lehman brs. 9/11 Russian and Iraq invasion
failure attacks LTCM crises of Kuwait
Sep - Oct 2008 Sep-01 Aug - Sep 1998 Aug 1990￿
United States 9.2% 0.4% 0.2% -1.8%
Canada -8.6% -1.9% -2.7% -0.4%
Japan 15.4% 1.6% 3.3% -0.7%
Australia -21.7% -3.8% -7.2% -0.4%
New Zealand -4.8% -2.2% -3.8% 1.0%
United Kingdom -1.3% 0.9% -0.9% 2.3%
Switzerland 3.4% 1.6% 3.7% 3.3%
Germany -4.5% 0.3% 2.0% 0.7%
France -4.2% 0.2% 1.4% 0.9%
Korea -20.9% -1.6% -7.8% -1.1%
Iceland -21.1% -1.8% -1.3% -0.3%
Poland -7.8% -0.1% -7.0% -2.2%
VIX 98.7 38.6 70.7 27.8
Notes: As a motivation for the sign restrictions chosen for the identi￿cation of risk aversion shocks, the table reports changes
in real e⁄ective exchange rates during selected historical episodes of heightened risk aversion for the currencies sign-restricted
under the identi￿cation scheme - and for the sake of comparison - the level of the VIX index during those episodes52
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